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President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems

SUMMARY MINUTES

Meeting of the President's Special Committee  
on Disarmament Problems  
Chart Room, Executive Office Building  
September 26, 1955 -- 10:30 a.m.

ATTENDEES:

Harold E. Stassen, Chairman  
General Herbert B. Loper  
Colonel William B. Bailey  
Mr. David Wainhouse  
Mr. Charles C. Stelle  
Mr. Ronald I. Spiers  
Mr. Andrew Berding  
Mr. Dowsley Clark  
Mr. Frederick W. Ford  
Mr. Nathan Siegel  
Mr. Herbert Miller  
Dr. Paul C. Fine  
Mr. James E. Goodby  
Mr. Robert E. Matteson  
Captain Donald W. Gladney  
Mr. Joseph S. Toner

PURPOSE:

To discuss: (a) the revised position paper on the U.S. Geneva Proposals (DCS/3, Rev. #3); (b) the preliminary progress reports of the Task Forces; (c) Mr. Bulganin's letter dated September 19, 1955 to the President, and (d) developments in the UN Subcommittee discussions during the week of September 19.

ACTION ASSIGNMENTS:

1. To reproduce the Moch paper dated September 22 and circulate copies to the Committee members.  
(Toner) NOTE: See DPC Note No. 4 dated September 27.

State Dept., NSC, JCS reviews completed

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2. State to study (a) the Moch paper, and (b) the Nutting proposal to determine whether the U.S. should agree to the tabling of those papers in the UN Subcommittee, with the stipulation that the U.S. does not agree with but will study these positions.
3. Assign Special Staff members to prepare working papers on possible U.S. positions on (a) the Moch paper and (b) the Nutting proposal. (Matteson)

DISCUSSION:

1. Revised Position Paper on US Geneva Proposals (DCS/3, Revision #3)

Mr. Stassen said that since there were no additional comments on the revised position paper on the U.S. Geneva proposals (DCS/3 Revision #3) the paper would be approved subject to later modification by the Departments should they desire to initiate a reevaluation.

2. Preliminary Progress Reports on the Task Forces

Mr. Stassen said the task forces are working diligently and in cooperation with the Department of Defense. The preliminary progress reports submitted by the Communications Task Force and the Army Inspection Task Force are now being studied by the Disarmament Staff.

3. Time Schedule for a Comprehensive Report to the President

Mr. Stassen said the November 1 time schedule for a comprehensive report, as outlined in previous Committee meetings, will still be adhered to even though the President may not be able to personally review the policy in early December as previously anticipated. He said, the overall paper, after the thirty day review period in the Departments, will reflect the most comprehensive study that any government has made on the total problem of disarmament. It will not constitute a rigid U.S. position; rather, the policy will be studied and reviewed on a continuing basis.

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4. Report on the UN Subcommittee Sessions

Mr. Stassen said the sessions of the UN Subcommittee were in recess and would reconvene at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, September 28.

(a) Moch Proposal. Mr. Stassen said Mr. Moch presented a paper for consideration at a conference of the Western delegates held on Friday, September 23. In general, the approach outlined in his paper is a more or less predismament phase along the lines of the Eisenhower proposal followed by stages of disarmament. At the end of those stages, Mr. Moch suggests that a conference of atomic scientists be called to study and report on whether it is possible to eliminate nuclear weapons. Mr. Stassen said Mr. Moch is apparently thinking of getting off the hook of a previous position on the elimination of nuclear weapons by a scientific study at the end of the conventional reductions and is giving some thought to limiting the expansion of nuclear weapons capability. Mr. Moch stated that he has the approval of his Government to discuss this position with the Western Powers.

ACTION: To reproduce the Moch paper and circulate copies to the Committee members. (Toner)  
Note: See DPC Note No. 4, dated September 27, 1955.

Mr. Stassen said it might be desirable for the U.S. to agree to the tabling of Mr. Moch's paper in the UN Subcommittee even though we would not concur with it at this time. The U.S. cannot agree to such a proposal until the total NSC review is complete, Mr. Stassen said, but if it proves to be a better position than the old Anglo-French proposals it would have the advantage of indicating a movement away from former rigid positions and would become a part of the movement of world understanding.

ACTION: State to study the Moch paper to determine whether the U.S. should consent to its being tabled in the UN Subcommittee with the understanding that the U.S. does not agree to but will study the proposal. (Wainhouse)

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b. Scientific Committee. Mr. Stassen said the U.K. has not yet reported on Mr. Nutting's suggestion for a Scientific Committee.

Mr. Wainhouse said that the Nutting proposal for the establishment of a Scientific Committee to study the problem of elimination of nuclear weapons, in a way, indicates some change in the British position.

Mr. Stassen said it might be desirable for the U.S. to consent to the tabling of that proposal as well as the Moch paper with the same understanding beforehand; i.e., we will not agree to it but we will study it. Both of these papers he said would serve to move world policy in the direction the U.S. wants it to move.

ACTION: State to study the Nutting proposal for a Scientific Committee to determine whether the U.S. should consent to its being tabled in the UN Subcommittee. (Wainhouse)

ACTION: Assign members of the Special Staff to prepare working papers on possible U.S. positions on (a) the Moch proposal and (b) the Nutting proposal. (Matteson)

5. Mr. Bulganin's letter to President Eisenhower dated September 19, 1955

Mr. Stassen said he noted with interest that in the Bulganin letter to the President there was little reference to the elimination of nuclear weapons, whereas in the Molotov UN speech that point was stressed. He suggested the reason for the difference of emphasis on this subject could reflect; (a) the propaganda aspect of the speech versus the realism expressed in the letter, or (b) a difference of opinion within the governing circles of the USSR.

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Mr. Wainhouse said with respect to the possibility of a difference of view with the Soviet Government, it had recently come to his attention that perhaps Molotov was following a fairly hard line. For example, a Russian delegate to the UN informed a U.S. delegate that the original text of the Molotov speech did not contain any reference to the difficulty of elimination of armaments.

General Loper said possibly the difference in approach between the letter and the speech indicates a moving away from elimination, thus reenforcing prohibition on nuclear weapons as the solution to the problem.

Mr. Berding suggested that since copies of the Bulganin letter were sent to the British and the French, it would be proper and perhaps desirable if they were to comment on the letter and therein inject their views on American bases on foreign soil for example, or thoughts such as those advanced by Mr. Moch.

Mr. Stassen urged that both Defense and State give further thought to possible modification of their views on the Technical Panel proposal now that the Soviet reaction to the President's proposal has been received. He asked that all Departments now consider in the light of the Soviet response, the advisability of the U.S. or another Western power putting that proposal forward or something along the lines of the USIA proposal for an aerial test inspection in an effort to keep things moving in the Subcommittee discussions.

General Loper raised a question as to the time schedule on the analysis of the Bulganin letter. Whether the Defense position on the Technical Panel Exchange will be modified in view of the Soviet reply, he said would involve another study for them to undertake. He said a meeting with State to discuss a reply to Mr. Bulganin's letter is expected to take place this week. Mr. Wainhouse said it is hoped that a first draft of a comprehensive reply would be ready sometime this week. It is planned, he said, to prepare an analysis of the Bulganin letter, paragraph by paragraph, as a basis for that reply.

Mr. Stassen said the time schedule for a reply to the Bulganin letter was a matter for State's consideration, but he did not think a comprehensive substantive reply could be prepared until after the total U.S. disarmament policy has been reviewed. For instance, comments could not be made on force goal levels nor on nuclear weapons other than to restate our position until the substantive policy is completed.

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In his discussion with Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Lodge, he said, the preliminary thinking was to prepare a sort of holding reply somewhat more than just an acknowledgement of the letter--on the basis that no substantive reply could be made until after the review of the total study. However, he said, he had not talked with Secretary Dulles on this matter since the President's illness.

Mr. Stassen read a suggested draft reply which he had submitted to the Secretary of State. His thinking, he said, was to keep all channels open and not have negotiating entirely on the Presidential level and, on the other hand, not to rebuff them too sharply from using that channel at any time if they should so desire.

Mr. Wainhouse said the Soviet response presents a problem on how we now proceed to further the President's proposal. He said his preliminary view is that we should attempt in the best way possible to put the Eisenhower proposal forward. He would not like to see the work of two or three months lost by virtue of the fact that we cannot get a Presidential response to the Bulganin letter.

Mr. Stassen said it is still possible that if the Russians find that this is the only way they can move on the disarmament problem, they may still accept the President's proposal; indications are that they are moderately respectful and cautious in their approach. On the other hand, he said, they may want to stall further progress or they may be attempting to get the West to reduce armaments. He said he did not believe world appeal for the Eisenhower proposal was minimized by the Bulganin letter. He asked that USIA follow the trend of Soviet propaganda with respect to the Russian's reply and also with respect to the Molotov speech as it unfolds in the next several days.

Mr. Stassen said the next two months can be well spent if we consider letting the Moch and Nutting proposals come forward and if we decide to submit a proposal along the lines of the Berding proposal. Also, he pointed out, the Foreign Ministers Meeting in October and following that the UN debate in December will require study and detailed preparations.

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6. Subcommittee Report for the Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Mr. Wainhouse asked Mr. Stassen whether he had received any guidance from Secretary Dulles with regard to an interim or progress report from the Subcommittee for the October meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Stassen said the Secretary indicated that he wanted him to be present when the disarmament subject was discussed, but he did not state his views on the Subcommittee reports. He said it is his impression that each of the four powers would report to their foreign minister rather than have a formal Subcommittee report. An attempt might be made, he said, to get an agreed report of the four representatives, for submission to their respective foreign ministers, setting forth the issues, which would not prohibit individual supplementary comments as desired. Mr. Stassen asked Mr. Wainhouse to discuss this matter further with the Secretary of State. Also, he said, either Mr. Wainhouse or he might ask the Secretary if this is a matter he would like to discuss with the other foreign ministers.

7. Exchange of Nuclear Weapons Information

Mr. Stassen said his feeling in postponing an answer to the Soviet question on the exchange of nuclear weapons information was that by spelling out that we will not exchange numbers, characteristics and design at this time would raise the presumption that we will exchange all other information. He said that endeavoring to be too inclusive in detail at this time might be bad psychologically and also bad for negotiations. He said he had an extensive discussion with Dr. von Neumann on this problem and he asked that AEC and Defense review this point in an effort to include language in our reply that will make it clear that we are not now agreeing to exchange any information; that everything has to be agreed to later in order to implement an effective inspection system. In other words, he said, our answer to their question should merely restate the principle of the President's Geneva statement and that specific information to be exchanged is a matter for later negotiation and agreement. The answer might include illustrative items, both negative and positive.

8. Justice Report on Legal Aspects of Technical Exchange Panel

Mr. Stassen asked for a report on the legal analysis of the problems involved in the Technical Exchange Panel proposal. Mr. Ford said further progress is pending a reply from some of the Departments to Mr. Rogers letter of September 16. Dr. Fine said AEC has prepared an answer which is being circulated in the agency for clearance. General Loper said the Defense reply is ready for the Secretary's signature.

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9. Public Relations

Mr. Stassen asked Mr. Berding if USIA had an overall report on the trend of public stories world-wide on the total problem of armament and disarmament. Mr. Berding said thus far there have only been spasmodic reports but he believed that a full reading should be undertaken at this point.

The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.

Helen Nelson  
Committee Officer

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President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems

SUMMARY MINUTES

Meeting of the President's Special Committee  
on Disarmament Problems  
Chart Room, Executive Office Building  
September 19, 1955 -- 10:30 a.m.

ATTENDEES:

Harold E. Stassen, Chairman  
General Herbert B. Loper  
Mr. Charles C. Stelle  
    Mr. Ronald O. Spiers  
Mr. Andrew Berding  
    Mr. John Z. Williams  
Mr. Frederick W. Ford  
    Mr. Nathan Siegel  
Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.  
Dr. Paul C. Fine  
    Mr. James E. Goodby  
Mr. Robert Matteson  
Colonel Raymond B. Firehock  
Mr. Joseph S. Toner

PURPOSE:

To discuss (a) progress report on the analysis of legal problems relating to the Technical Panel Exchange, and (b) Mr. Berding's proposal for an aerial test inspection within the framework of the President's Geneva proposal.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. To further review the proposal for aerial inspection submitted by Mr. Berding after Mr. Molotov's opening speech at the UNGA
2. To review the outline of the President's plan as tabled in the Subcommittee to determine if an addendum is required.

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## DISCUSSION:

1. Progress report on the analysis of legal problems relating to the Technical Panel Exchange.

Mr. Ford reported that a meeting of legal representatives from State, Defense, AEC and Mr. Turlington from Mr. Stassen's staff was held in the Department of Justice on September 14, to study the various legal problems posed by the Technical Panel Exchange proposal. He said William P. Rogers, the Acting Attorney General, wrote to the heads of the agencies represented at the meeting on September 16, 1955 requesting that they furnish the Attorney General with an opinion from their legal staff on the problems that might arise in their respective agencies in connection with such a proposal. A letter was also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury since Coast Guard facilities would also be involved in the inspection of ports. At the meeting, he said, it was urged that the highest priority be attached to this study.

Mr. Stassen, replying to Dr. Fine's question, said there are really three interrelated sets of legal questions involved in the total plan; those related to (a) the President's proposal for an exchange of blueprints and aerial verification, (b) the Technical Panel Exchange, and (c) the final inspection system. The questions related to the President's blueprint proposal and those connected with the permanent inspection system would come under a treaty arrangement; therefore, the study now is concentrated on the extent to which the Technical Panel Exchange proposal could be implemented under an Executive Agreement. Mr. Ford said there may be some problems involved even under a treaty arrangement. For example, revealing information and trade secrets to a foreign government which the U.S. Government obtains in confidence from a private firm may pose a problem. Mr. Stassen said when the current study is completed the next step may be to determine the limits of a treaty in this field.

2. Report on Mr. Stassen's discussion with the President.

Mr. Stassen said he reviewed for the President the anticipated time schedule of the work of the task forces; the personnel on the task groups; and the endeavor to prepare a comprehensive report for him on or about December 7. The President, he said, was satisfied with the time schedule and he was extremely pleased with the caliber of the personnel working on the task forces; at the same time the President urged that all phases of the work continue to be carried forward in the departments and agencies.

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3. Proposal for an aerial test inspection within the framework of the President's Geneva Proposal.

Mr. Berding said he had nothing to add to the written proposal he had submitted (circulated on September 14) for an aerial test inspection within the framework of the President's Geneva proposal. He noted that recent conversations with USSR delegates to the U.N. Subcommittee indicate that the Soviets have regarded the President's reference to an exchange of blueprints and aerial reconnaissance as a propaganda move. It may be, he said, that they still entertain that view to some extent and this proposal may help to overcome that idea. Also, the proposal would serve to demonstrate to the Soviets just what aerial reconnaissance will reveal.

Mr. Stelle said the Department of State has not prepared a final position on this paper. Discussions thus far, he said, indicate a divided opinion within the Department. Some see considerable propaganda advantages in such a proposal and view it also as a means of moving forward; others are concerned about possible competition between this plan and the President's proposal.

General Loper said the Department of Defense has no firm position to offer at this time. He pointed out that past Defense positions indicate that they do not look with favor upon any kind of implementation prior to acceptance of the principles of the President's proposal. The study currently under way by Defense, he said, is directed first toward the implementation of the President's proposal from the standpoint of exchange of blueprints and the subsequent aerial reconnaissance; second, toward something along the lines of this proposal as a trial run; and third, if the trial run proves to be effective and agreeable, the detailed arrangements for the total plan.

Dr. Fine asked whether the blueprints of a major atomic energy installation would merely outline the exterior of the buildings or whether they would include such details as processes. Mr. Stassen said the concept of the exchange of blueprints has always been in relation to an exterior examination, which at a certain point could involve checking the input and output of the plant. He pointed out that at no time would we contemplate an exchange of technical information such as methods of weapons design. In the first stage the concept is to determine what kind of information can be reciprocally

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exchanged to prevent the possibility of surprise attack. He said that information could be negative or affirmative, but in his view no detailed answers would be provided which would give the Russians an excuse to reject the President's proposal.

Mr. Stelle pointed out that, since the U.S. has taken the position that the major problem is the impossibility of accounting for nuclear material, to table an outline of the proposal for a Technical Panel Exchange confined to external examination of one nuclear plant would present a difficult political problem.

General Loper said, as a trial run the JCS had in mind something specifically directed to surprise attack and from that point of view the objectives outlined in Mr. Berding's proposal appear to be broader than necessary. If the idea for a trial run were accepted, he said, he could see no point in including a major atomic energy center. Mr. Stassen agreed, and said that the objective of a trial run could be limited to include only one port and one air field.

With respect to the timing of such a proposal, Mr. Stelle said depending upon the circumstances it might be desirable to present it before the Russians indicate what their reaction to the President's proposal will be since it may serve as a means of bringing their attention back to that position.

Mr. Stassen said that was a good point and he noted that Soviet reaction to the Eisenhower proposal might be presented: (a) in Molotov's speech at the opening of the U.N., (b) at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Meeting on October 27, or (c) during the UN debate on December 1 over the UN resolution to accept the President's proposal.

Mr. Stassen said this proposal would be kept under review and considered further after Molotov's U.N. speech.

#### 4. Proposed Scientific Committee.

Mr. Stassen said the British Government has not yet replied to Mr. Nutting's suggestion for the establishment of the scientific committee discussed in the meeting on September 12.

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Dr. Fine said Dr. von Neumann feels that the probability of such a group of scientists coming up with a solution for detection methods or for a means of accounting for past production of fissionable materials is so slim that the establishment of a scientific committee to study these problems would only raise false hopes.

Mr. Stassen explained that the basic concept of the suggestion is to convince the world that we are leaving no stone unturned in the search for a solution. The U.K. now agrees with us that you cannot eliminate nuclear weapons and they are trying to find a way to present that position to their public and to their parliament. In other words, until the scientists report back, we will proceed on the basis that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated and then the President's proposal will be brought back into focus. In addition, this group of scientists from the five nations represented in the Subcommittee could, from time to time, invite the comments of scientists from other nations such as India and Egypt, thus including and encouraging other countries to join in the effort to find an answer to this problem.

Mr. Stelle said State's view with respect to internal examination of a nuclear installation is also based somewhat on the public relations aspect. For instance, the internal examination of a research reactor would reveal the difficulties involved and would assist in convincing the public at large of the scientific basis of that policy.

Replying to Mr. Berding's inquiry about the scientific study currently under way, Mr. Stassen said that is the Ernest Lawrence task group. With respect to the task forces, as a whole, Mr. Stassen said the tentative thinking is not to publicize their studies until such time as the report to the President is made and acted upon and the President or the Secretary of State enunciate the various aspects of our policy.

5. Proposed briefing on aerial photographic capabilities.

Mr. Stassen said Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson in a letter dated September 16 approved the suggestion in his letter of September 13 for a briefing and short brochure on the capabilities of aerial photography for dissemination among the British, French and Canadian disarmament delegations, and that later, if appropriate, such a presentation might be circulated to the USSR. Mr. Robertson has requested the Secretary of the Air Force to appoint a project officer to prepare this brochure and presentation, within security limits.

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(Copies of Mr. Stassen's letter and Mr. Robertson's reply were circulated by EXSEC to Committee members on September 19).

Mr. Stassen said the purpose of these briefings is two-fold, One, to educate the public domestically as well as abroad as to the significance of aerial reconnaissance--within classification limits; and second to maintain the initiative from the public relations aspect on the part of the U.S. and the Eisenhower proposal.

Mr. Stassen noted that comments from State approving the dissemination of information to the U.K., France and Canada are contained in Cable 168 (dated September 15). In view of State's feeling that the Soviets should not be included in the original briefing because others may raise questions in their presence which might indicate a division of opinion on efficacy of aerial reconnaissance, Mr. Stassen said we could make it clear in the briefing that any questions they wished to raise must be submitted in writing at a later time for our further consideration. He asked that the Departments continue to review the possibility of including the Soviets on the basis of no questions being asked or answered at the briefing session.

6. Agenda items.

Mr. Stassen asked if there were any subjects the Committee would like to submit for future discussion. He noted that the revision of the position papers is under way, and Colonel Firehock said the revised papers will be ready early in the week of September 26.

Mr. Stelle said it might be well to review Mr. Hoover's suggestion of putting forward some expansion and clarification of the outline of the President's plan which has been tabled in the Subcommittee. Mr. Stassen said that outline plan would be further considered to determine whether an addendum is required.

(Mr. Stassen left the meeting at 11:15 a.m. and turned the meeting over to Mr. Matteson.)

Mr. Matteson asked if there were any further suggestions for subjects to be discussed, or any new matters to be brought up.

Mr. Stelle asked if a list of the task forces and their operations could be made available to the Departments. It would be useful, he said, to know generally what developments have occurred in their studies. Mr. Matteson said he had sent a note to each of the

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liaison officers on Mr. Stassen's Special Staff to prepare a progress report on each of the task forces by the end of this week. He said some of the task forces have submitted progress reports but others have indicated that their studies will take longer than the present time schedule indicates.

Mr. Bissell asked if there was any written material available with respect to the general terms of reference of the task forces. He said such information would be extremely helpful in conducting briefing sessions for the task groups.

Mr. Matteson said the Department of Defense had received that information. In general, their studies are related to the feasibility of inspection and beyond that at their own discretion to the total outline of the plan.

(NOTE: Terms of reference for each task force and other personnel data are being prepared in EXSEC for circulation to the Committee members.)

The meeting adjourned at 11:25 a.m.

Helen E. Nelson  
Committee Officer

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President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems

SUMMARY MINUTES

Meeting of the President's Special Committee  
on Disarmament Problems  
Chart Room, Executive Office Building  
September 12, 1955 - 10:30 a.m.

ATTENDEES:

Harold E. Stassen, Chairman  
General Herbert B. Loper  
Colonel William B. Bailey  
Mr. David Wainhouse  
Mr. Charles C. Stelle  
Mr. Ronald O. Spiers  
Mr. Andrew Berding  
Mr. John Z. Williams  
Mr. Frederick W. Ford  
Mr. Nathan Siegel  
Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.  
Dr. John von Neumann  
Dr. Paul C. Fine  
Mr. James E. Goodby  
Mr. Robert Matteson  
Mr. Joseph S. Toner  
Mr. Edmund Gullion  
Mr. John Lippmann

PURPOSE:

1. To discuss: (a) JCS comments on the Technical Exchange Panel; (b) Department of State comments on U. S. Geneva Proposal, and (c) Dr. von Neumann's comments dated September 7, 1955.

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CONCLUSIONS:

1. To amend the position papers in accordance with the comments of: (a) the JCS (DCS/5B); (b) Dr. von Neumann (letter dated September 7, 1955), and (c) the Department of State (DCS/3 Revision #2A).

2. That the Committee would meet regularly each Monday at 10:30 a.m.

DISCUSSION:

1. Report on the UN Subcommittee Sessions

Mr. Stassen said the Western delegations are presently awaiting comments from the Soviet Union on the significant parts of the President's proposal and on other questions relating to the inadequacies of previous USSR positions on inspection. In view of the relatively short period of time the meeting has been underway, he said, the situation could not be described as "deadlocked" but neither has any significant progress been made. There is further evidence that the Soviet Union is analyzing the basic problem just as we are.

ACTION: To reproduce and circulate to Committee members the September 7 statement by the Russian delegate, Mr. Sobolev, to the UN Subcommittee.  
(Toner - see memorandum dated 9/12/55)

2. JCS Comments on the Technical Exchange Panel Proposal (DCS/5B)

Mr. Stassen asked for comments around the table on the JCS comments on the Technical Exchange Panel proposal.

Mr. Wainhouse said the State Department agrees with the JCS position that a panel should be established which would be composed of technically and scientifically qualified individuals from each of the countries represented in the Subcommittee; that this group would study the methods of inspection and report back to the Subcommittee at an agreed time. In view of its terms of reference this group might be called a Study Group on Inspection and Reporting Techniques.

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Mr. Wainhouse said State will be in a better position to comment on the detailed comments of the Joint Chiefs (DCS/5B) after there has been a Soviet reaction to the President's Geneva proposal.

Generally speaking, he said, the Department of State agrees with Defense on reducing the number of installations from two to one in each category which might be visited. State does not share the Defense view that the atomic installation should be examined only externally; rather, it is believed that little would be gained by such an examination.

Mr. Wainhouse said it would be helpful to the Department of State if Defense and AEC would provide them with a more detailed exposition of their concept of external inspection of atomic installations. Dr. von Neumann said a great deal can be exposed by external operations; for example, if the amount of raw material going into a reactor is known much can be told of the interior activities. Mr. Stassen noted that this would also tie in with Dr. Lawrence's work.

Mr. Stassen replied that it is not known when the Russians will respond to the Eisenhower Proposal, but when they do, the U.S. position on how to proceed after that should be as thoroughly prepared as possible. He urged that the studies on this problem continue to go forward in the Departments.

Dr. von Neumann said he had no comments other than those contained in his letter to Mr. Stassen dated September 7.

Mr. Bissell said in general he agreed with the detailed comments of Defense but he preferred to reserve opinion on the point raised by Mr. Wainhouse respecting external examination or a more comprehensive plan in connection with atomic energy production facilities. Dr. von Neumann said this is a two-fold problem and the question involves the amount of information we extract from the USSR by this means as against the information we would be furnishing them. It is the feeling in AEC, he said, that the way it is now defined, the time allowed is very short; in some cases, such as budget, it is a matter of the extent that it adds to the information furnished and from that point of view the external examination is a good first step. It should be judged more from the standpoint of negotiation tactics.

Mr. Bissell said he may wish to submit written comments on this point before the next meeting of the Committee.

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Mr. Berding said he had no comments on the detailed revision of the JCS on this proposal. As a matter for possible consideration, he suggested that the test inspection idea might be transferred to the President's aerial reconnaissance proposal. This would have certain advantages such as keeping the President's proposal alive and supplying tremendous publicity to it.

Mr. Stassen said that when the panel tested objects of control, they were also going to test methods which would include aerial inspection. The first impact of the Eisenhower proposal concentrated on aerial photography and the exchange of blueprints; the second impact was to put in the JCS plan on ground posts. Replying to Mr. Stassen's question, Mr. Berding said he meant that the aerial proposal would include some testing, and in the beginning it would be limited to aerial reconnaissance. Mr. Stassen said that is sort of an offshoot of the matter we are presently concerned with, and referred to a letter on this subject submitted by the Department of Justice on September 9 (DCS/5C).

Mr. Ford said the first indication was that the legal problems involved were not too difficult but upon further study it was found there were not sufficient facts known to prepare a definitive statement. He said if the attorneys at AEC, State and Defense could meet with the legal persons concerned in Justice to discuss the problems involved it would greatly facilitate the Department of Justice in preparing a comprehensive legal opinion.

Mr. Stassen said he believed the best way to proceed would be to have the lawyers from AEC, Defense and State get together with Mr. Ford's group either by departmental or multi-departmental informal conferences and then to get a written statement which would outline the problem and state what information is required from the individual Departments. Through such informal conferences an outline can be prepared of what can be done and what cannot be done under Executive agreement. He said we may have to approach this matter by treaty or we may decide to do as much as is possible under Executive agreement and no more. The lawyers should define the problem and outline the alternatives as well.

ACTION: To follow through with the Department of Justice on setting up meetings during the week of September 12 with AEC, State and Defense re an analysis of the legal problems stemming from the Technical Exchange Panel proposal. (Matteson)  
Note: This meeting was held on 9/14.

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Mr. Stassen said the revisions on the Technical Exchange Panel Proposal submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be accepted. He emphasized that this proposal could not be used in any way as an ultimatum requiring the USSR to accept the President's proposal before we proceed with this kind of study. He said this proposal would not be advanced until we get the Soviet reaction to the President's proposal. Also, on State's position, he said he believed it would be a mistake to advance a proposal for a study group that in effect would meet in the same city as the Subcommittee and discuss the same matters as the Subcommittee. He said his feeling now and it will have to be evaluated further is to concentrate entirely on the President's proposal and think in terms of either working this out with the Eden proposal or working it out as suggested by Mr. Berding as a third stage.

Replying to Mr. Wainhouse's question, Mr. Stassen said if the Soviet Union should accept the President's proposal the exchange concept might then be advanced and it would mean that the other countries could participate in it which would be an advantage since the Eisenhower proposal refers only to the US and USSR.

3. Comments by Dr. von Neumann dated September 7, 1955

Replying to Dr. von Neumann's question, Mr. Stassen said it is contemplated that inspection would be carried on simultaneously in the various countries rather than one at a time in a specified order. It is believed that the simultaneous approach would be advantageous from the psychological as well as the negotiating standpoint.

General Loper said some of the questions raised by Dr. von Neumann would require further detailed study by the Department of Defense.

Referring to Dr. von Neumann's comment on paragraph E-4 on page 6 of the position paper on the USSR Geneva Proposal (DCS/2, Revision #2) Mr. Wainhouse recommended the following wording for the quoted passage, "the US position on this must await the determination on whether the development of an adequate inspection system is possible." Mr. Stassen said it is only possible to determine whether it is possible at this time, and times keep changing. Mr. Wainhouse said State would agree to

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the phrase, "at this time." Mr. Stassen said he believed there was general agreement on State's implication.

Mr. Stassen said the position papers should be amended in accordance with Dr. von Neumann's comments, as modified by State.

4. State comments on the U.S. Geneva Proposal (DCS/3, Revision #2)

a. Paragraph 1 (a). There was general agreement on paragraph 1 (a) revised by the Department of State.

b. Paragraph 1 (h). General Loper said the modifications submitted by State are acceptable to Defense, particularly with reference to paragraph 1 (h). Mr. Stassen said this raises the point of waiting for the later date rather than dissipate the move at the present time, and that further study would be given to that point.

Mr. Berding suggested that the attention on the President's proposal would be heightened if the proposal were made to institute a test inspection of aerial reconnaissance on a limited basis now. Mr. Stassen said that is an interesting thought -- to segregate the aerial reconnaissance testing and visiting of a sample object from the other categories to be tested and visited. He noted that though it would increase attention on the Eisenhower proposal, it could in effect, from a public opinion standpoint, let the Soviet off the hook if they agreed to permit a small area to be photographed. It is a matter of evaluating the complex world psychology and pressure aspects.

Mr. Wainhouse said his initial reaction to Mr. Berding's suggestion is that actually it means carving the sector on aerial photography out of the President's proposal--the other sector being the exchange of blueprints--and reducing our attention to one small sector might supply the coup de grace to the President's proposal. Mr. Stassen said it would not be a matter of reducing; rather Mr. Berding's suggestion would serve as a spearhead of the implementation of the plan.

Mr. Wainhouse pointed out that the Russians conceivably might come forth with a reduced aerial inspection area; for example, a hundred square miles of arctic waste, to see how it works out. Mr. Berding said it would mean selecting comparable points such as New York and Leningrad but it would be on a reduced basis.

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Mr. Stassen asked Mr. Wainhouse for an appraisal of what the Soviet reaction will be to the President's proposal.

Mr. Wainhouse said it is expected that they will submit a counteroffer, which will revolve primarily on their May 10 position and they may include aerial reconnaissance over the ports, airdromes and so on that are contained in their proposal. It is possible that we will not get a Soviet response before October 27 since they may prefer to use the Geneva forum rather than the Subcommittee meeting for their reply.

Dr. von Neumann pointed out that if the aerial reconnaissance aspect is separated from the exchange of blueprints in the President's proposal, there is danger giving away certain intelligence information, whereas if a complete set of blueprints were available the operation would be on the basis of information furnished by the other nation. Mr. Stassen said that problem could be met by requiring each side to offer the site they will permit to be photographed and on which they will submit blueprints rather than have or tell the other what they want to see. It might mean that each would give a blueprint of say Leningrad or Norfolk for example, to start with and then have the aerial photography and the ensuing studies of that. He said Mr. Berding's suggestion would be given further consideration.

c. Paragraph 2 (b). Mr. Stassen said he fully concurred in the revised language of this paragraph, particularly since a Soviet counterattack may be that the President's proposal is simply a stalling device and that the U.S. does not favor a reduction of armaments under any circumstances. He said a certain amount of world opinion shows a trend along that line and articles have been written on the basis of Secretary Quarles' speech to advance that argument. He said his initial reaction to Secretary Quarles' speech was that it contained no specific inaccuracies but it omitted what should be an important feature of any address by government officials and that is to emphasize the desire of the United States and the President for peace and a sound agreement. Mr. Stassen said not only have the British and French asked whether that speech represented U.S. policy but the Russians have asked for an interpretation of it.

He said he had sent a preliminary informal memorandum to the State Department and to the USIA setting forth a possible public relations outline. Mr. Wainhouse said State would have a reply to that memorandum within a day or two.

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Mr. Ford suggested that the word "might" in line 2 of paragraph 2 (b) be changed to "should". Mr. Stassen said it could read, "...and it is U.S. policy that this would be followed..." or some such wording which could be chosen from the President's own language.

Mr. Stassen asked whether there were any further questions on the comments submitted by the State Department or whether there were any new matters to be discussed.

5. UN Exhibit to illustrate the President's proposal.

Mr. Berding said a special committee has been established to work on an exhibit to illustrate the President's idea of an inspection system, particularly with respect to the aerial inspection. The committee has concluded that such an exhibit during the General Assembly sessions is both possible and desirable and is thinking in terms of installing the exhibit in the United Nations lobby or, if that is not desirable, in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Mr. Berding said it might be premature at this time to approach the Secretary General of the United Nations on this matter. Mr. Wainhouse pointed out that placing such an exhibit in the United Nations building could be construed as forcing the issue. It would be quite within reason, he said, to ask the Secretary General to permit an exhibit of this kind if the Russians give an indication of an affirmative response to the President's proposal, but if their reply is negative or if it is not submitted during the course of the General Assembly, he could see no objection to having the exhibit in the Waldorf Astoria.

Mr. Stassen said he believed such an exhibit would have merit and that the preparation of it should go forward. He asked that Mr. Berding, with the assistance of the Air Force, proceed on the preparation of an exhibit.

6. Aerial Reconnaissance.

Mr. Stassen asked General Loper if it would be possible to work out some briefing sessions within limitations for the British, French and Canadians on the subject of aerial reconnaissance. Colonel Bailey said Colonel Firehock had given him a list of questions submitted by the British but it was for informational purposes rather than action responsibility. Mr. Stassen said he would submit that list of questions to the Secretary of Defense and ask for the JCS comments on it.

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General Loper said that in addition to the questions submitted on the list there would be a great many other questions on the details of the President's proposal and it, therefore, would be well to indicate to the Joint Chiefs what priority this should have in connection with their study of the overall job of the technical aspects of a comprehensive limitation of armaments plan. Mr. Stassen said he believed the British, French and Canadians would want this information by the middle of November but the sooner the better. Some of the questions might be answered promptly he said, and answers to others could be postponed on the basis that they require further study.

7. Scientific Committee.

Mr. Stassen said Mr. Nutting, in an effort to get a public declaration of the impossibility to inspect and control the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, suggested--subject to approval by his Government--that a scientific committee composed of scientists from the five nations in the Subcommittee be established for the purpose of furnishing a scientific basis to government leaders of the U.K., Canada and France and other western powers to present this position to their public and to their parliaments. Mr. Wainhouse said there is a cable dated September 9, 1955, No. 251 from US-UN New York to the Secretary of State relating to this suggestion of a Committee of Scientists. (The Department of State sent copies of this cable to the Departments and Agencies concerned on September 12, 1955).

Mr. Stassen said it is important to convince the public that our position that we cannot eliminate nuclear weapons is based on a scientific analysis. If there is a favorable response from London this week, he said, this matter could be further reviewed at the next Committee meeting.

It was agreed that the Committee would meet regularly each Monday at 10:30 a.m.

The meeting adjourned at 12:05 p.m.

Helen E. Nelson  
Committee Officer

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President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems

SUMMARY MINUTES

Meeting of the President's Special Committee  
on Disarmament Problems  
Chart Room, Executive Office Building  
September 1, 1955 -- 3:30 p.m.

ATTENDEES:

Harold E. Stassen, Chairman  
Colonel William B. Bailey  
Mr. David Wainhouse  
Mr. Howard Meyers  
Mr. Charles C. Stelle  
Mr. Andrew Berding  
Mr. Abbott Washburn  
Mr. John Z. Williams  
Mr. Frederick W. Ford  
Mr. Benjamin Freidson  
Mr. Richard M. Bissell  
Dr. John von Neumann  
Dr. Paul C. Fine  
Mr. James E. Goodby  
Colonel Raymond B. Firehock  
Mr. Joseph S. Toner

PURPOSE:

1. To discuss comments of the Department of Defense on:  
(a) the Technical Exchange Panel, (b) the USSR Geneva Proposal, and  
(c) the U.S. Geneva Proposal.

2. To discuss the legal aspects of the Technical Exchange  
Panel.

3. To discuss the revised draft position paper on Previous ILLEGIB  
United States Positions.

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ATTACHMENT A

(Changes to DCS/2, Revision 1, recommended by the Department of Defense).

Page 2, Par. 2, Line 3: Insert the words, "among others" after the word, "that". Reason: It must be emphasized that the United States cannot accept the provisions of the Soviet proposal on inspection as restrictive.

Page 2, Par. 2, Line 12: Delete word, "an" and change word, "example" to the plural.

Page 2, Par. 2, Line 13: Delete the word, "minimum" and the phrase "to be included". Reason: It must not be inferred that the United States would regard the listing which follows as an actual statement of our minimum position.

Page 2, Par. 2(b), Line 4: Delete the word, "limited" and substitute "United". Capitalize the word, "states".

Page 2, Par. 2(c): Add to the sentence, "and other appropriate rights and privileges". Reason: To provide for other than diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Page 3, Line 2: Add the phrase, "on a continuing basis" after the word, "area".

Page 3: Suggest the addition of the following subparagraph before the existing subparagraph (e). The addition then would become (e) and the existing (e) would be renumbered (f). Language as follows:

"(e) The Control Organ would have the power to decide that a violation of the agreement had occurred. The administrative procedure by which such a decision would be made must be provided for in the agreement, as well as a delineation of the action to be taken by the Control Organ in the event that such a decision were made." Reason: The question of how the inspecting mechanism would arrive at the conclusion that a violation had occurred is an extremely important one. Witness recent experience in Korea. It is felt that a reference to this point is desirable in this paper.

Page 3, Subpar. (4): Add to the sentence the words, "for military purposes". Reason: To emphasize the military aspects of the inspection.

Page 3, Subpar. (5): Add the following sentence to this subparagraph: "The term, 'replacement' to be fully defined in the disarmament agreement."

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ATTACHMENT A

Page 4, Par. D.2.: Delete the last sentence of this paragraph and substitute the following: "The position of the United States on the question of force levels is such that the setting of arbitrary ceilings for nations large or small is unrealistic at the present time. The United States position on this portion of the July 21 Soviet proposal should be the same as that contained in Par. E.3. on Page 5."

Page 5, Par. E.3: It is suggested that this paragraph read as follows:

"3. Force Levels:

The United States recognizes that numerical limitations on armed forces will constitute one of the components of any comprehensive system for the reduction and control of armaments and armed forces. However, the United States considers that the figures for numerical ceilings on armed forces introduced in the most recent Soviet proposals are, like those of the United States and other nations, suggested for the purposes of illustration and do not bear an actual relationship to strategic considerations or to the specific security requirements of any state. The United States intends to regard these proposals as a line of departure in developing and reaching an understanding on realistic force levels in the context of whatever may be achieved on the other substantive features of an arms limitation arrangement. In discussions toward this end a number of factors including demographic, geographic, political and economic must be taken into account." (Note: This language is in consonance with Pars. 3 and 4 of Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of August 19, 1955.)

Page 10, last paragraph, 2nd line: Delete the words, "the greatest" and substitute the word, "adequate".

Page 10, last paragraph, 4th line: Delete the phrase, "the greatest amount of procurable" and substitute the word, "acceptable". Reason: The "greatest" is subject to interpretation and in any case may not be what the United States would consider a sufficient reduction in risk to satisfy its national security requirements. By the same token what others may consider to be "the greatest amount procurable" may prove to the United States inadequate.

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ATTACHMENT B

(Changes to DCS/3, Revision 1, recommended by the Department of Defense).

Page 1, 2nd Par. of "Conclusions" - Add the word, "subsequently" after the word, "expanded". Reason: To bring this paragraph in consonance with Paragraph III(a).

Page 2, Paragraph II: Assume word, "purpose" should read, "proposal". Subparagraph II(a): Add the words, "and ground" between the words "aerial" and "inspection" in the last line on the page. Reason: To bring in the thought contained in subparagraph (g) below.

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ACTION ASSIGNMENTS:

1. To revise, in accordance with Defense comments, and circulate draft position papers on the USSR Geneva Proposal (See DCS/2 Revision #2), and the U.S. Geneva Proposal (See DCS/3 Revision #2).
2. To circulate the preliminary and detailed comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Technical Exchange Panel (See DCS/5A and DCS/5B).
3. To circulate comments on Previous United States Positions (See DCS/6A).
4. To circulate comments by the Department of Justice on the legal aspects of the Technical Exchange Panel.
5. To circulate draft position paper on the Technical Exchange Panel, as revised by a member of Mr. Stassen's Special Staff.
6. The Department of State to draft a suggested revision of Paragraph I, subparagraph (a) of the draft position paper on U.S. Geneva Proposals (DCS/3, Revision 1).

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DISCUSSION:

1. Report on the Subcommittee Sessions

Mr. Stassen reported that the outline plan on the implementation of the President's Geneva proposal has been tabled along the lines of the JCS memorandum, and that the sessions were progressing much as was anticipated. Among the questions asked by the Soviet delegate Mr. Sobolev, which are under advisement by the U.S. delegation, are: (a) whether the U.S. agrees that the objective continues to be the abolition of nuclear weapons, and (b) whether the U. S. still agrees to the force goals previously submitted. Mr. Stassen said Mr. Sobolev told him that the Soviet still holds to its May 10 language with respect to the unaccountability of nuclear materials and the possibility of clandestine production.

Mr. Stassen said he believed the U.S. would have to place its old positions in a reserved and inactive status very soon. The Canadians have expressed the hope that progress on the previous positions would not be lost and it is expected that there will be active discussion of that matter before long.

He said there is general agreement to take the outline plan of the President's proposal under advisement, and a Soviet response is anticipated during the week of September 5.

2. JCS Preliminary Comments on a Technical Exchange Panel

Referring to the September 1 memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Technical Exchange Panel (circulated at the meeting), Mr. Stassen said we plan to first present the President's proposal and the resolution that it be referred to the General Assembly. We had not, however, anticipated that "prior acceptance" of that proposal would be a condition precedent to any other study. He said he did not understand the basis for the JCS "prior acceptance" position nor for the statement, "It should be recalled that one of the principal purposes of this proposal was to insure against surprise attack by either side and thereby create a suitable climate for further progress in the field of international limitation of arms. The proposed exchange of a Technical Panel would not provide this insurance." He asked Colonel Bailey for a copy of the August 26, 1955 memorandum referred to in the JCS September 1 memorandum which may have served as the basis of this position.

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Colonel Bailey said he believed that foremost in the minds of the Joint Chiefs was the fact that the existence of the Technical Exchange Panel proposal in the Subcommittee prior to a commitment by the USSR would afford the Soviets an opportunity to evade a commitment on the Eisenhower Geneva proposal. The JCS feel strongly that it would be extremely advantageous to the U.S. if the Soviet Union would agree on the President's proposal as a first step.

Mr. Wainhouse asked whether the JCS position means that the United States should not go on with anything in the way of inspection until there has been prior acceptance by the USSR of the President's proposal, or whether it is just a matter of timing. Colonel Bailey said he believed it is primarily a matter of timing. Mr. Wainhouse replied that if that were true he believed the Department of State would go along with that position.

Mr. Stassen said he felt that the JCS paper is contrary to the President's statement and contrary to the directive at Geneva because it implies reserving previous Presidential and NSC decisions by in effect saying that nothing should be done unless the Soviets first accept the Eisenhower proposal. The final directive on which the four heads of government agreed in Geneva states that the Subcommittee is to proceed to develop a sound inspection system and does not refer to any prior step of accepting the President's proposal as a condition to developing such a system.

Mr. Wainhouse suggested that a position paper be prepared which would relate the Technical Exchange Panel proposal in terms of time and tactics to the President's proposal as a means of clarifying this matter.

Colonel Bailey said that if Mr. Stassen feels the U.S. should proceed with the technical panel proposal, the Department of Defense would urge that the panel be limited in scope, if possible to a study of objects of control, and that the traveling aspects of that study be omitted.

Mr. Stassen said we are more or less faced with three problems: (a) how to proceed in the study we were directed to conduct by the heads of government, the President, and the NSC; (b) how to get off the hook, as directed, on the old force levels and the abolition of nuclear weapons and at the same time maintain

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a forward moving partnership with the UK, France and Canada on their proposals; and (c) how to keep the U.S. initiative. He said upon receiving a favorable response from both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, consultations were begun on the suggestions advanced in his letter of August 15. Further, if the U.S. were now to put the President's proposal in the light of an ultimatum, we would in effect change all of our previous positions; we would have difficulty with our allied associates; and we would be placed in an unfavorable position before the world.

Replying to Mr. Stassen, Colonel Bailey said the detailed comments on the Technical Exchange Panel by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are expected to be available by September 3 (see DCS/5B).

3. Defense Comments on USSR Geneva Proposals (DCS/2, Rev. 1)

Mr. Stassen read from General Loper's letter, dated August 29, the recommended changes by the Department of Defense to Revision 1 of the preliminary draft position paper on the USSR Geneva Proposals (see Attachment A).

ACTION: To indicate substitutions and deletions in DCS/2, Revision 1, as recommended by DOD and circulate the revised draft to Committee members. (Toner)

4. Defense Comments on US Geneva Proposals (DCS/3, Rev. 1)

Mr. Stassen read the recommended changes in General Loper's letter, dated August 29, pertaining to revision 1 of the preliminary draft of the United States Geneva Proposals (see Attachment B).

ACTION: To indicate substitutions and deletions in DCS/3, Revision 1, as recommended by DOD, and circulate the revised draft to Committee members. (Toner).

A. Agreement on Limitation of Armaments. Mr. Wainhouse said Paragraph I, subparagraph (a) under recommendations sets forth the philosophy that the U.S. does not "contemplate entering into any agreements on the limitation of armaments or armed forces prior to the resolution of certain major political issues causing international tension." He said the State Department does not share the view that these are dependent matters; rather, it is believed that the U.S. can go a long way toward developing progress in arms limitation without awaiting a resolution of the major international

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issues causing international tensions. Further, he said, he believed that was in accordance with the NSC philosophy.

Mr. Stassen said that is a matter on which Defense and State differ. He explained that the position of his Special Staff, as reported to the President in its report, was that the two might well occur in parallel; that you would have some settlement of political issues and concurrently some limitation of leveling off of armaments. In other words, some improvement in the arms race might create a climate in which some of the political differences could be resolved, and, conversely, a reduction of major political issues such as a divided Germany would facilitate progress on a limitation of armaments agreement.

Mr. Stassen asked that the Department of State draft a suggested revision of Paragraph I, subparagraph (a) of DCS/3 Revision 1, and said that after the Department of Defense had an opportunity to review and comment on that revision it would be discussed further in an effort to resolve that issue.

ACTION: To draft suggested revision of Paragraph I, subparagraph (a), page 1, of DCS/3 Revision 1, US Geneva Proposals. (Wainhouse)

Colonel Bailey said the Department of Defense would have no objection if the language were drafted in the context of the NSC Action No. 1328 and Mr. Wainhouse said he believed it would be quite satisfactory to the Department of State if the paragraph were made to reflect Mr. Stassen's remarks with respect to "concurrent" and "parallel."

B. Technical Panel. Mr. Wainhouse, referring to paragraph I, subparagraph (h) of DCS/3 Revision 1, said he assumed the views expressed at the previous Committee meeting on the technical panel were presently under consideration, particularly in light of the JCS paper. Colonel Bailey said it would be helpful to Defense to have a concrete indication of State's views on that proposal. Mr. Wainhouse said it is State's view that introducing this proposal at this time might deflect from the President's proposal and create confusion. He recommended that the extent to which this panel will go in and visit objects of control be studied further, and stated that the Department of State would not object to a smaller version of the type of visits contemplated in the position paper. He said the present difficulty on this proposal is largely because at the time Secretary Dulles

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replied to Mr. Stassen's letter of August 5, the position paper had not been seen; the exact timing of this proposal in relation to the tabling of the President's proposal was not known nor was the quantum of responsibility of the panel known.

Colonel Firehock said he had the draft position paper on the Technical Exchange Panel as revised in accordance with the discussion of the last Committee meeting.

ACTION: To circulate the revised preliminary draft position paper on the Technical Exchange Panel.  
(Toner)

5. Timing of the comprehensive U.S. Position on Inspection

Mr. Stassen said he was in receipt of a letter from the Secretary of Defense outlining the manner in which the special task forces working on the various sections of the total inspection problem would work with the three Services. It is agreed that upon completion of the comprehensive inspection plan--presumably about November 1, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have thirty days in which to review and comment on the plan. Those comments will then be considered before the final comprehensive plan is presented to the President and the NSC about December 1.

Replying to Dr. von Neumann, Mr. Stassen said all Departments and Agencies concerned will be allowed a thirty day period in which to comment on the comprehensive plan. If a further revision of the plan is necessary in the light of these comments, he said, we may need further time before presenting the final recommendation to the NSC.

6. Department of Justice Comments on the Legal Aspects of the Technical Exchange Panel

Mr. Ford said the Department of Justice has a draft report prepared as to the legal problems involved in the Technical Exchange Panel proposal and that a final paper would be ready within the next few days. He said the problems are not as difficult as they first appeared to be. Technically, various statutes can be evaded but the major problem is that we are dealing with a statute that was specifically drawn up to prevent disclosure of the very information we are intending to disclose now. Mr. Stassen said in a way we have two problems: (a) to determine whether you can legally comply with the

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law under these circumstances, and (b) to hold some Congressional consultations so that we do not get an adverse reaction from that group. It is understandable, he noted, that a statute which states that you will not give out information which will aid the enemy would draw an entirely different interpretation from giving out information in a mutual exchange of information to advance the cause of peace.

ACTION: To circulate the Department of Justice comments to Committee members. (Toner)

Mr. Stassen said it would greatly facilitate the Committee discussions if all papers submitted by the Departments were sent to Mr. Toner (Room 325 E.O.B.) for circulation in advance of the meetings.

7. Preliminary draft on Previous U.S. Positions (DCS/6A)

Mr. Stassen said this revision is in accordance with the discussion in the last Committee meeting which was to bring the paper in line with the Secretary of State's letter of August 15.

Mr. Berding said from the public relations point of view, he was pleased to learn of the position to hold in a reserved and inactive status the position on force goals. If we were to give the impression which is created by the JCS paper that we are opposed to accepting those previous force levels, it would create a difficult public relations problem because the USSR in its May 10 proposals gave the impression that they are accepting the previous British and French positions. Mr. Stassen agreed and added that if the U.S. suddenly, after nine years of advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons and after three years of advocating a force level ceiling of a million and a half men each, withdrew those positions we would be presented with a tremendous public opinion problem; that is why we say "reserved and inactive status."

Colonel Bailey said the JCS position is that we never in fact really proposed or accepted those force levels of a million and a half men; the U.S. simply put these figures on the table for discussion purposes and that purpose was made clear at the time it was tabled. The difficulty is that certain people in other governments have seized upon these as a fixed U.S. position and the Soviet Union, in turn, picked them up.

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Mr. Stassen said he asked Mr. Sobolev whether the press story that came out of Moscow that the USSR was going to report their armed forces strength to the United Nations Disarmament Commission was true. Mr. Sobolev replied that he had no doubt it was a true story; that he had no information on it from his Government, but he would inform Mr. Stassen when and if he did get any such information. Mr. Stassen said there may be some further initiative on their part in this respect.

8. Press Briefings

Mr. Berding said this UN Subcommittee meeting has attracted far more public attention world-wide than any of the previous UN Subcommittee meetings and in the eyes of the world there is far more importance attached to it. For that reason he said he would hope that the Geneva method of procedure would be adopted. Mr. Stassen said he could fully understand that view, and that the Secretary of State has emphasized it, but the British and French favor closed meetings. He said he has encouraged the British, French and Canadians to accept some of our press background procedure if they don't want to adopt the full Geneva method and it is hoped that it will unfold in that direction.

Mr. Stassen said the Committee would meet on September 8 to discuss the detailed JCS comments on the Technical Exchange Panel proposal, the comments by the Department of Justice on the legal aspects of that proposal and the revised draft position paper on the Technical Exchange Panel.

The meeting adjourned at 4:45 p.m.

Helen E. Nelson  
Committee Officer

Attachments

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President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems

SUMMARY MINUTES

Meeting of the President's Special Committee  
on Disarmament Problems  
Chart Room, Executive Office Building  
August 25, 1955 - 3 p.m.

ATTENDEES:

Harold E. Stassen, Chairman  
General Herbert B. Loper  
Colonel William B. Bailey  
Mr. David W. Wainhouse  
Mr. Howard Meyers  
Mr. Charles C. Stelle  
Mr. Abbott Washburn  
Mr. John Z. Williams  
Mr. Oren Stephens  
Mr. Frederick W. Ford  
Mr. McKay Donkin  
Colonel Raymond B. Firehock  
Mr. Joseph S. Toner

PURPOSE:

To discuss (a) preliminary draft U.S. position papers prepared by members of Mr. Stassen's Special Staff, and (b) the proposals submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. To revise the draft position paper on the USSR Geneva proposals in accordance with the discussion.

2. To revise the draft position paper on the U. S. Geneva proposals in accordance with the discussion and to embrace the JCS proposals.

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3. To prepare a paper setting forth the U.S. objectives in the August 29 UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting in New York.

4. To make the substitutes and deletions as indicated in the various draft position papers.

DISCUSSION:

1. Preliminary Draft Position Papers

A. UK Geneva Proposals. Mr. Wainhouse said that the State Department is in general agreement that the UK proposal is not a disarmament proposal within the terms of the responsibilities and duties of the UN Subcommittee, and would prefer that their proposal be placed in a reserve status, if the British could be persuaded, and that President Eisenhower's Geneva proposal would be given first priority.

On page 1, paragraph (a) under "Recommendations", he said the word "inappropriate" is perhaps not too well chosen. Our argument on that matter could focus on the necessity for going forward with the President's proposal with our undivided attention rather than to involve questions related to a security pact.

General Loper agreed with Mr. Wainhouse that the focus of attention in the UN Subcommittee discussions should be on the objectives outlined in President Eisenhower's Geneva proposal.

Mr. Stassen suggested that if the British should persist in presenting their proposal, it might be desirable to develop a retreat position which would tie in a sample technical study of some of the forces in Europe, particularly Germany, with the Eisenhower proposal. Mr. Wainhouse said in light of Secretary Dulles' strong feeling that the attention of the Four Ministers in the October 27 meeting should focus on the problem of unification, with security following that, he was inclined to believe that the British would be persuaded to accept our proposal.

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B. USSR Geneva Proposals. Mr. Wainhouse said the draft position paper on the USSR Geneva proposals appeared to be generally useful, but he would like to make a few suggestions:

(1) That paragraph II A - 21 July Proposals Preferable to May 10 for Discussion be recast to clarify that the USSR should be induced to introduce their July 21 proposal rather than their May 10 proposal at the opening session and to use that position as a basis for any discussion of the Soviet position.

(2) That in paragraph II C 1 - The Pledge against "first use of nuclear weapons" the earlier US declarations in the UN in which we have agreed not to use any weapons for purposes of aggression be restated and stop there.

Mr. Stassen said that would spring from the obligations in the UN Charter and the position paper should therefore avoid any wording or inference which would limit the type of weapons used in defense. Replying to Mr. Stassen's question, Mr. Meyers said the language in the old US position is that we will not use nuclear weapons or any other weapons contrary to our UN Charter obligations; i.e., we will not use them except in defense against aggression or in any way other than in conformity with our UN obligations. Mr. Stassen said that same wording might apply, but that point should be checked.

Mr. Wainhouse further suggested:

(3) That in paragraph II D 2 - Disclosure, the word "official" appears to be inadequate protection for the United States and that the words "full and accurate" might be substituted. Mr. Stassen agreed and suggested the words "full and actual figures" might be substituted.

(4) That the phrasing in paragraph II D 6 - Moratorium on nuclear tests be stated in more general terms on the basis that nuclear tests should await a disarmament program supported by adequate safeguards; the reference to "magnitude" should be omitted.

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Mr. Stassen asked whether the words, "and should not be the subject of a separate agreement" should be added. He said he knew that the phraseology meant after the signing of the armament convention, but suggested it should perhaps state, "soon after, but only after" or words to that effect. Mr. Wainhouse said in view of the fact that this will be part of the comprehensive plan which will be subject to the inspection concept throughout, he wondered whether any agreement was necessary.

Mr. Wainhouse suggested that paragraph II D 8 - Pledge Against Use of Nuclear Weapons, be rewritten to conform to paragraph II C 1.

General Loper said the paper as a whole appears to be a proposal largely of our own position rather than an analysis of the Soviet May 10 or July 21 proposals. He said he had assumed that a paper along these lines would only be presented in the event it became necessary to counter the May 10 or July 21 USSR proposals, and in such an event, the primary purpose was to discuss certain aspects of these papers rather than the details of a comprehensive inspection system during this session of the UN Subcommittee.

With respect to the inspection and control system, he said Defense takes the view that requirements such as the rights, functions and objectives of the inspection organ are not as well stated in the paper under discussion as they have been put forward in previous papers submitted by the U. S.

Specifically, he said, he agreed with the detailed comments presented by Mr. Wainhouse on the U. S. position on the use of nuclear weapons.

On the matter of suspension of tests, he said, Defense is in agreement that this should not be a separate agreement in any way and would be inclined to omit it even from an armament convention unless such an armament convention went so far as to exercise a certain degree of control over research and development as well as armament. To the moratorium on nuclear tests, he said he would add that these would be acceptable only if the armaments convention took cognizance of research and development activities as well as the levels of arms.

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Mr. Stassen said in the original studies the view was that research cannot be effectively controlled since it involves trying to control a man with a pencil and mind, which is impossible and unenforceable, but with respect to the development and testing of intercontinental missiles or thermonuclear weapons, you could control it because you could ascertain its violation. He said if we could reach a point where there was an effective inspection system that was supporting a limited agreement and, as one part of that, thermonuclear testing was stopped by the USSR as well as by the US, there would be a significant gain in our future security because the USSR has not, as of this stage, reached that kind of testing.

Mr. Stassen said paragraph II D 6 - Moratorium on Nuclear Tests should be reworked to omit the reference to "magnitude" and to state that it would "cease only in connection with an armaments convention of a nature so comprehensive as to make such a clause therein contained to be appropriate", or words to that effect, and to contain language stating that the U.S. considers that no separate agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests in advance of other types of agreements would be desirable. Mr. Wainhouse said the phrase "in advance of" might not be necessary if we have a comprehensive plan about nuclear tests.

Mr. Stassen agreed with General Loper that there should be a reference in the recommendations to negotiating insofar as feasible, on the basis of the U.S. proposals, and avoid discussion and negotiation on the basis of the Soviet proposals, then proceed to our various analyses of the July 21 and May 10 Soviet positions. He suggested that a new paragraph A be inserted under "Recommendations" incorporating this point.

General Loper said Defense had no specific comment on paragraph II C 2 - Small State Force Levels; Defense did, however, comment in the JCS paper (DCS.8) on the suitability of using numerical levels, but not in the context used in the paper under discussion. Colonel Bailey added that Defense is not prepared at this time, nor do they believe it desirable, to go into detail as to specific force levels.

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Mr. Donkin said the following sentence in paragraph II D 4 - The 75-25 Two-Stage Concept: "Only then can it be determined what armaments can with a reasonable degree of safety be reduced or eliminated and what the relative rates of reduction should be," may be premature, since it is not really contained in Phase I of Volume I. It was agreed to delete this sentence.

Mr. Donkin said Admiral Strauss shares the view of the Defense Department on the moratorium of nuclear tests.

C. U.S. Geneva Proposals. Mr. Wainhouse said it is the general view within the State Department that the draft position paper on the US Geneva proposals is amplified by the JCS blueprint paper, which provides a basis for initial presentation of the President's proposal, and that these two papers should be consolidated and significant details should be supplied.

Mr. Wainhouse suggested, and Mr. Stassen agreed, that the following sentences beginning on page 7 should be deleted: "It will be noted that the quotations above do not include the President's proposal to the USSR, 'to give each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments' and 'to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country'. This dramatic offer does not appear suitable in itself for presentation in the Subcommittee since it is a unilateral approach to the U.S.S.R., although it is assumed that other countries might strongly favor some agreement between the two great powers."

Mr. Wainhouse said this paper appears to go beyond the JCS paper in some ways, and seems to be premature in view of the fact that it goes into a comprehensive disarmament system which is considerably beyond our intent at this time.

He had no comments on specific statements except that both the JCS paper and this position paper would require more intensive reworking and analysis in the Departments concerned if they are to be discussed as a basic and firm U. S. position.

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General Loper said some of the statements in the paper appear to be inconsistent with the President's thoughts as understood by Defense; e.g., on page 3 paragraph (12), "This limited first step should apply not only to the U.S. and the USSR, but also, to all nations having significant armed forces," and on page 7 we appear to agree to eliminate that part if the offer is not suitable. Mr. Stassen said it had been agreed to eliminate this and suggested that paragraph (12) on page 3 might state words to the effect that it would be desirable if this limited first step were also applied to other nations having significant armed forces. We do want to avoid bringing other nations in in such a way that it would give the Soviets a reason for delaying their acceptance of the U.S. position. In a way, he said, we have two proposals; we have a central core proposal of the Soviet and the U.S., and also, we would be willing to embrace collateral or related proposals to bring others into it, but this should not be taken as an essential part of the initial step. General Loper agreed.

Mr. Stassen said this paper should be reworked in the light of the above discussion and to embrace the JCS proposals.

Mr. Donkin said the AEC believes that the phrase "significant armed forces" in paragraph (12) on page 4 might be too restrictive at a future time when conceivably many nations will have an Atoms-For-Peace program and production of plutonium. Mr. Stassen said that might be reworded to state, "significant armed forces or significant nuclear potential" or "significant weapons potential."

D. French Geneva Proposals. Mr. Wainhouse noted that there is no discussion of the relationship between the Faure Plan and the SUNFED paper. He said the Department of State believes that the paper should discuss the meaningfulness of the budgetary limitations in a totalitarian economy. We are aware he added, of our budgetary limitations as such; they are highly inadequate as a system of control, but as a part of a comprehensive plan, perhaps budgets do have a place.

General Loper agreed with the conclusions of the study and with Mr. Wainhouse's comments.

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E. Technical Panel Exchange. Mr. Wainhouse said this paper had been studied in careful detail, and that the author should be congratulated. He suggested however, that the emphasis placed on a technical panel inspection of the scope indicated in this paper might tend to distract from concentration on the President's proposal for exchange of military blueprints and aerial inspection. It is State's view, he said, that the paper places such stress on the testing aspect of the panel exchange that it might be considered as an intelligence operation instead of a means to facilitate a broader agreement. He suggested it might be advisable to concentrate the panel activities on developing an agreement on objects of control, with the concept of test inspection of a rather limited scope coming as a by-product of those discussions. Such an approach, he said, would ease us into the stage that is indicated desirable in the paper, whereas if we push the panel concept at this stage, in the terms set forth in the paper, a fragmented discussion would result which could lead to negative results. Mr. Wainhouse said that view has been expressed to the Secretary of State, but the Secretary has not had an opportunity to review the recommendation.

General Loper agreed with the comments of Mr. Wainhouse.

Mr. Donkin said Admiral Strauss had observed that this is an interesting approach to test USSR willingness to come to grips with the inspection problem. He does not feel there is involved here any commitment by the U.S. which is irrevocable. Mr. Donkin said it appeared to him that subsequently, this matter could be made consonant with the President's proposal by the addition of one other sentence on page 3, "Test inspection within these categories and furnish a list of detailed items for the inspectors to verify." Blueprints and aerial inspection would then be included and this would clarify the meaning of the paper.

Mr. Ford said the Justice Department has had an opportunity to make some analysis of the technical panel approach and they have assumed this would be undertaken without any legislation. However, he said, legislation for the past ten or fifteen years has concentrated on concealing this kind of information, particularly in the technical fields; for example, there is a limitation on some types of military information

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that could be viewed depending on how the Department of Defense has treated that information. In order to arrive at any definitive conclusions, he said, the assistance of experts in the various departments would be required.

Mr. Stassen asked that a memorandum be prepared by the Department of Justice setting forth the classes of material that can be revealed according to law and those that cannot be revealed, as a guideline from the legal standpoint of the information that is required from the experts in the various departments and agencies. He said from the results of the studies by Justice as to the legal implication and the studies of the experts from Defense and AEC, we will have to figure out what the desirable and legal boundaries are with respect to the technical panel approach. One aspect of that approach, he pointed out, is the amount of pressure you wish to put on the Soviets to test their intentions in the armaments field. For instance, there is no pressure applied if the objective is to have a group of experts sitting together to determine if they can agree on a list of objects of control, but immediate pressure is applied if you want them to allow some technical experts to enter their country to see something and they do permit such exchange of visits; their resistance of openness and the Iron Curtain is broken down a bit. He said a more limited list than is indicated in the paper could be envisioned as a part of the study. He noted that Secretary Dulles' letter stated, "The proposal you put forward for a reciprocal exchange of pilot inspection by a panel is a good one and the Department believes it might serve as an effective channel toward agreement on some of the technical elements of control." Our position, he said, would have to be worked out carefully and in some detail before the proposal is tabled.

Mr. Wainhouse said that the two aspects of the President's proposal -- "exchange of blueprints and reciprocal aerial inspection" are really enormous pressures, and acceptance of those first would make easing into this panel idea very much easier; on the other hand, if they accept the President's proposal there would be no need for a panel. He said in his opinion, the limited panel visit and limited testing of methods of inspection, including aerial survey, is the wedge by which you try to move into the complete President's proposal, and from that you go on to a still more comprehensive setup.

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Mr. Stassen said it is his view that this is a step toward accomplishing the President's proposal and toward more comprehensive agreements beyond that; that a proposal for inspectors to inspect one air installation would receive a sharp focus of public opinion, because if you opened up one port, they would say the whole group should be opened up. I would focus world public attention on the Soviet's rejection of something the world believes they should do, or if they accept it, it would have immediate intelligence importance, serve as a further impetus toward the President's proposal, and after that to the still more comprehensive and over-all arrangements. He agreed that the paper under discussion is a bit expansive; on the other hand, he said, two ports or two air bases is a long way from looking at the whole of Russia.

Mr. Donkin said it is noteworthy that five of the eight categories listed in this paper are included in the Soviet May 10 proposal. General Loper said the list of facilities to be inspected does not bear any particular relationship to the primary objective of the proposal, which is to guard against surprise attack, but it points toward a method of getting at the reliability of a comprehensive inspection system which has as its objective the determination of a total military posture, which is quite another matter. As a first step, he said, we should determine whether we are going to make a test as to the feasibility of setting up a system which will guarantee against surprise attack versus a system which is designed to level off. He said he was speaking particularly of manufacturing installations rather than SAC or TAC bases.

Mr. Stassen pointed out that the guiding policy in the U.S. Government now is not simply one of endeavoring to advance an inspection system for surprise attack but to advance an inspection system for a comprehensive disarmament program. General Loper said he agreed, but he understood that this is a part of the basic paper which will be considered and presented to the Security Council as against an attempt to exploit the President's proposal in the Subcommittee meetings; in other words, it is a differentiation between the immediate tactics in the forthcoming meeting and the long pull objectives. Mr. Stassen said President Eisenhower is trying to fit them together; that he used the immediate proposal as a way of dramatizing the elements of the long term situation, and he incorporated the long term aspects in the same message.

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General Loper agreed that the immediate and long term aspects must be consistent; however, he said, to go as far as this paper proposes would be beyond the competence of the panel to accomplish within a reasonable period of time.

Mr. Wainhouse raised the question of timing with respect to the tabling of the technical panel position and the tabling of the President's proposal.

Mr. Stassen said he believed the President's proposal should go forward at the opening session of the Subcommittee, and quite soon thereafter the technical panel proposal should be put forward, depending somewhat on the attitudes of the other governments in the informal discussions prior to the opening session. The timing would also depend on whether the Soviets are ready for an exhaustive exchange on the Eisenhower proposal, he said, or whether they take the position that their study on his proposal is continuing and they are not ready to give any further answers at the present time.

Colonel Bailey said he would like to add to General Loper's comments that although there is no objection in Defense and the JCS to the proposal as outlined in Mr. Stassen's letter to the Secretary of State (August 5, 1955), there is military objection to certain of the actions to be performed by the inspecting panel as outlined in the position paper. For that reason, he said, Defense would welcome the opportunity to work with Mr. Stassen's staff in modifying these parts of the proposal to the extent believed desirable. Mr. Stassen said he would appreciate comments of the Defense Department on specific points in this paper.

Mr. Stassen said he envisioned that our comprehensive recommendations on the inspection system would be ready by November 1, that it would then go to the Departments for thirty days review, and then be discussed in the NSC early in December. He said if this kind of technical exchange panel is approved, he would expect the visits to take place early next year, so there would be a firm U.S. position established in advance of our exchange visits and from the added information resulting from these visits, the United States Government would continue to review its position. A U.S. agreement to such a report as envisioned on page 2 of this paper, he said, would not be granted unless it measured up to U.S. standards and policy.

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D. Previous U.S. Positions. Mr. Wainhouse said the paper appeared to be a very useful one. He suggested that paragraph 1 of the Recommendations be rewritten to include all of Secretary Dulles' language regarding the meaning of "reserve and inactive status." Mr. Stassen agreed and said the wording in paragraph 3 of the Secretary's letter dated August 15 would be incorporated as suggested.

Mr. Wainhouse pointed out that paragraph 3 on page 6 made no reference to the Four Powers paper which deals with the principles of control which were introduced in London last May. He said the UK will probably raise that matter with Mr. Stassen. Replying to Mr. Stassen's question, Mr. Wainhouse said he would supply the exact date of that paper.

Colonel Bailey said he assumed the reference on page 5: "in the Committee of Five meeting in London in 1952" was to the Disarmament Commission discussion. Mr. Stassen said the reference would be checked with respect to the date and wording or location, and he also agreed with Colonel Bailey that on page 7, reference to the outcome of the technical exchange panel's work and to the U.S. position should be transposed to place emphasis on the outcome of the studies in the United States Government.

Colonel Bailey noted on page 8, paragraph 7, that the word "also" tends to play down the importance of the basic U.S. proposal and suggested that word be deleted.

Mr. Stassen said we must constantly reiterate that we have not withdrawn and we are not reaffirming our previous positions because the press will tend to take one view or the other. They will want to know if this is a signal of withdrawal or disavowal, and exactly what it means. It means, Mr. Stassen said, that we are in an extensive study and we are placing our previous positions in a reserved and inactive status--and the definition of those words can be found in Webster's dictionary. Also, if the proposal for test visits of the exchange panel is put forward before the reserved and inactive status proposal is presented we would create an understandable and good psychological basis to the world at large.

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Mr. Williams said the field personnel and the USIA media have been alerted to rest their case thus far on the President's statement in Geneva, and this will carry them until there are further developments and public statements. Answering Mr. Washburn's question, Mr. Stassen said it is still premature to line up the press.

Colonel Bailey said the wording on page 12 under paragraph C, "The general philosophy of this paper appears to be in keeping with the existing United States emphasis" should read "is in keeping" because the NSC paper setting forth such policy has never been revoked.

F. International Preparatory Commission. Mr. Stassen said the matter of an International Preparatory Commission has been deferred, but there is the question of tabling a proposed resolution on the President's proposal and the timing of such a resolution. Mr. Wainhouse said in light of the general philosophy being developed in the exchange of these papers, and bearing in mind Ambassador Lodge's letter to Mr. Stassen, it would be State's view that a draft resolution could be put in the hands of the Secretariat Monday morning under cover of confidence, with the request that the draft resolution be on the table the first day. He said he hoped that the discussions with the British, French and Canadians within the next few days would lead to a complete accord on that tactic, but they may wish to refer the matter back to their respective governments. The resolution appears to be generally satisfactory, he said, but he would like to have the JCS paper incorporated either as an annex or in the body of the resolution. Colonel Bailey agreed with Mr. Wainhouse, and added that it might be desirable to have a U.S. paper on the table expanding along the lines of the JCS staff proposal and as modified. It would be difficult to reach a well thought out solution by Sunday night, he said, and possibly a compromise could be worked out by inserting a reference to a future U.S. proposal in the resolution. Mr. Stassen said we could refer to the President's proposal at Geneva without spelling it out, and subsequently amend it by referring to an annex of a document that is to be subsequently presented. This matter will be considered further with the Secretary of State and the other Governments.

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2. JCS Proposals. Mr. Wainhouse said it is State's view that the most effective portion of the President's proposal was the offer of mutual aerial inspection, and the aspect appears to be subordinated in paragraph b. (2) on page 3 where it states, "Aerial Reconnaissance . . . to augment the efforts of the posted observers." Colonel Bailey said the question of emphasis could be easily handled with the JCS paper is incorporated in the draft position paper. He believed it is recognized that there is going to be aerial inspection and the President's proposal is accepted for exactly what it is, but the feeling in Defense is that there should be concurrently a ground inspection. Mr. Stassen said he believed this position paper could be reworked to take account of both the position of the State Department and the position of the Defense Department. He suggested that the proposal on ground observers might be placed in the status of a U.S. adoption of the Soviet inspection suggestion of ground posts; that would not in any way devalue the President's proposal.

Mr. Stassen agreed with Colonel Bailey that caution should be exercised with respect to the Russian proposal to avoid putting them in the driver's seat on ground inspection because our view may not necessarily coincide with theirs. We might say, "Taking note of or being aware of the Soviet emphasis on ground inspection posts, it is our proposal that the ground inspection posts "X", "Y", and "Z" . . ." Mr. Wainhouse agreed and suggested it might be more tactical if we yielded on this by way of an amendment rather than incorporating their ideas in our proposal in the first instance. Mr. Stassen said the JCS apparently do not wish, and understandably so, to table a detailed paper on implementation of the President's proposal without working in the ground aspects of the inspection. This matter can be worked out, he said.

Mr. Donkin suggested that the wording in paragraph 2: "complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations" be elaborated somewhat to include a list with functions and locations. Mr. Stassen agreed and asked Colonel Bailey to refer that suggestion back to the Department. There should be a complete list, he said, indicating in general terms the functions and location of each.

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With respect to the definition of "order of battle," Colonel Bailey said he would prefer to reserve a position on whether the words in the military dictionary should be substituted in the JCS paper.

Mr. Stassen said the preliminary draft position papers would be reworked in the light of the discussion and would be resubmitted for consideration by the Committee.

Mr. Wainhouse recommended and Mr. Stassen agreed that a paper be prepared outlining the U.S. objectives in the forthcoming Subcommittee meeting.

3. Information Procedures. Mr. Wainhouse recommended that in light of past experience in the London meetings, press briefings should be conducted after the meetings; this would not exclude quiet exchange if quiet exchanges were indicated. In other words, he said, each delegation should be free to brief its own press as a means of bringing pressure on the Soviets and in terms of our objective in the light of the President's initiative at Geneva. Colonel Bailey agreed and added that it might be desirable to have the meetings completely open. Mr. Washburn said USIA concurs with Mr. Wainhouse's view. Such briefings would be extremely helpful to USIA in effectively interpreting the events in the Subcommittee throughout the world. Mr. Stassen agreed that the Geneva method of handling the press information should be followed. He said it is his feeling that we should move into these discussions in the spirit of the Geneva conference but with a move for concrete results; we want to advance understanding of the U.S. positions and particularly identify the President and the Secretary of State with an earnest search for a just peace. He said armed limitation is a part of that total package, and he hoped that the USIA approach will be to keep a flow of the type of information that tends to keep a certain amount of pressure on the Soviets to come along in a concrete way, but not in such a way as to give them an excuse for a misunderstanding and flare-ups, and not move. It should be kept in mind, he said, that our established U.S. policy is to endeavor to reach a sound and effective agreement on the limitation of arms.

The meeting adjourned at 5:30 p.m.

Helen E. Nelson  
Committee Officer

Distribution: Attendees  
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President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems

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SUMMARY MINUTES

Meeting of the President's Special Committee  
on Disarmament Problems  
Chart Room, Executive Office Building  
August 22, 1955 -- 3 p.m.

8/22/55

ATTENDEES:

Harold E. Stassen, Chairman  
General Herbert B. Loper, Defense/JCS  
Mr. David W. Wainhouse, State  
Mr. Robert Bowie, State  
Mr. Howard Meyers, State  
Mr. Abbott Washburn, USIA  
Mr. Oren Stephens, USIA  
Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., CIA  
Mr. Frederick W. Ford, Justice  
Mr. McKay Donkin, AEC  
Colonel Firehock, Acting Staff Director  
Mr. Joseph S. Toner, Executive Secretary  
Mr. Edmund Gullion, Special Staff Member

PURPOSE:

To discuss: (a) the organization of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems; (b) the composition of the US delegation to the UN Disarmament meeting; and (c) proposed US position papers for the UN Disarmament Subcommittee Meeting on August 29, 1955.

CONCLUSIONS:

To meet on Thursday, August 25, 1955 at 3 p.m. to discuss in detail: (a) the Department of Defense comments on the points contained in Mr. Stassen's letter of August 5, to the Secretary of Defense; and (b) the preliminary draft US position papers submitted by members of Mr. Stassen's Special Staff.

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DISCUSSION:

1. Committee Organization

Mr. Stassen said he was pleased to meet with the members of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, and their associates. The months immediately ahead may prove to be a very busy period of working together, he said, which may prove to be of very great significance with respect to constructive steps taken in our own country's security and in world relationship, or it may turn out to be a tedious and frustrating experience.

A. Membership. Mr. Stassen said Admiral Strauss had advised him he would designate an AEC representative to serve on the Committee in the near future and that McKay Donkin, a member of Mr. Stassen's Analytical Staff would serve in the meantime. He noted that other Department Representatives are: David W. Wainhouse, Department of State; General Herbert B. Loper, Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff; Andrew Berding, and his alternate, Oren Stephens, United States Information Agency; J. Lee Rankin, Department of Justice; Richard Bissell and his alternate, [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency; Robert E. Matteson, Staff Director, and Joseph S. Toner, the Executive Secretary.

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Mr. Stassen suggested that each member of the Committee have no more than one staff assistant present at meetings, and in special instances where a Department or Agency may wish to have additional persons present, arrangements should be cleared through the Executive Secretariat (Mr. Toner) beforehand.

He said that within a few weeks he hoped every member and alternate would have "Q" clearance and that only additional persons with "Q" clearance would attend Committee sessions after that time.

B. Title and Function. Mr. Stassen said the Committee would be known as the "President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems" in accordance with the President's letter of August 5, 1955, authorizing its organization. As a Presidential Committee, all questions related to it such as staff papers, summary minutes, or Committee deliberations carry with them complete Presidential privileged status.

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Mr. Stassen pointed out that the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems is an Interdepartmental Representative Group which reflects the views of the individual Departments concerned as contrasted to his Special Staff which is a special study group that works with him in considering Departmental positions and in making recommendations to the President.

2. US Delegation to the UN Subcommittee Meeting.

Mr. Stassen raised the question of the composition of the U.S. delegation to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting beginning in New York on August 29, 1955. He said he favored a delegation similar in composition to the U.S. delegation at London-- the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC should each have two regularly assigned, full time, persons, one of whom may, at the option of the Department, be the same individual as the one serving on this Committee, and one or the other should be present at all sessions or consultations that may take place in New York.

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There should be present two persons from Ambassador Lodge's UN Staff; also, there should be available at all times to the Subcommittee delegation, one Russian language officer either from State or the US-UN Staff.

Replying to Mr. Wainhouse's question, Mr. Stassen said Mr. Wadsworth had indicated to him that Mr. MacSweeney might be made available as the Russian language officer and would perhaps serve as one of the members from the UN-US Staff, but this is not a firm decision.

Mr. Wainhouse agreed that one Russian language officer should be available and said that Mr. MacSweeney would be an excellent choice since he has had some experience on the substantive side of the Disarmament discussions in London. He said his availability

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
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would probably depend in large measure on whether the Subcommittee meets during the General Assembly sessions. Mr. Stassen said we would have to plan on the basis that the Subcommittee will meet during that time, particularly, if the Subcommittee meeting proves to be productive.

With respect to the Department of Justice, Mr. Stassen said they should indicate whether they want someone in New York with the delegation, or whether they wish to keep in contact from Washington through this Interdepartmental Committee and advise on such legal questions as may arise through that process. That decision may be reserved, he said, until the sessions have been opened.

There was general agreement that the composition and size of the U. S. delegation as set forth by Mr. Stassen was desirable and reflected the interested Government Agencies.

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Mr. Donkin said AEC would have some difficulty in finding the precise technical personnel to send to New York, and that AEC might want to alternate or have people travel back and forth. Mr. Stassen said he would discuss that with Admiral Strauss.

Mr. Washburn asked if Jack Williams who is on Ambassador Lodge's Staff and the regular USIA policy man in the UN who funnels information to the media for overseas and also advises on general world opinion aspects on any action or positions taken, could attend the sessions at will, but not to preclude Mr. Berding and Mr. Stephens from attending part of the time. Mr. Stassen said it would be all right, but suggested that since Mr. Williams would undoubtedly be involved in many other matters he would prefer that there be somebody who is more or less constantly in the picture from USIA.

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Colonel Firehock asked if Mr. Stassen meant his outline of the delegation to be indicative of the type rather than restrictive insofar as State and Defense membership in New York is concerned. Mr. Stassen said those Departments could have additional staff backup and advisory people, and suggested that if the discussions should shift from time to time and involve intensive discussion of certain elements of the total problem, they might want different kinds of specialists or different Service people present.

Mr. Stassen said it is expected that preliminary consultations will begin on Friday, August 26, in New York with the British, French, and perhaps the Canadians, and some tripartite consultations perhaps with the Russians before the formal opening of the meeting on August 29. The presence of at least one of the Department representatives in New York at that time would be helpful.

3. US Positions for the UN Subcommittee Meeting

Mr. Stassen said his letter of August 5 to Secretary Dulles and the Secretary's reply contain the broad context of U.S. positions needed for the opening period of the August 29 session, subject to more detailed position papers, and that any differences of view in any Department over these points will be worked out within the next few days. He called attention to Mr. Anderson's letter stating that the points contained in Mr. Stassen's letter are consistent with existing NSC documents.

A. Heads of Government Positions. With respect to paragraph 1 of Mr. Dulles' letter dated August 15, 1955, Mr. Stassen said it raises the question of how much detail should be given on the President's Geneva proposals. He asked for views on whether the respective positions of the four heads of government as presented at Geneva should be considered at the opening of the session. General Loper said this was agreeable with Defense, and there was no dissent on this procedure voiced by the other Committee members.

B. Definition of "Blueprint" and "Aerial Survey". Mr. Stassen asked what progress the Joint Chiefs had made on the definition of "blueprint" and "aerial survey." General Loper replied that the JCS have prepared their definition of "blueprint" in broad language, and it will be presented formally to Mr. Stassen within a day or two. He summarized the JCS definition as follows: First, "The term 'blueprint of military establishment' is defined as

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consisting of the complete order of battle of all major land, sea, and air forces, and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations." Second, "Each nation will station observers at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to verify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization." And, Third, "Each country shall permit unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance by the other country." "The term 'aerial reconnaissance' as used herein includes visual, photographic and electronic means of observation."

Mr. Stassen asked whether "order of battle" had the same meaning to the five nations concerned that it has to our own Services, or whether we should have a written definition of that term. General Loper said he did not believe there was a common understanding of the term, and felt that it would require broader spelling out to insure we are all talking about the same thing. As used by the JCS, he said, "order of battle" is assumed to apply to only those forces which are competent to have some effect in the matter of surprise attack. He said it should also be made clear how far down the scale you will go with respect to defined size and purpose of military organizations such as divisions and squadrons.

Mr. Stassen said the definition would also include any statement on total numbers in the armed forces of actual personnel and asked whether the JCS had covered this. General Loper said the JCS had not covered this in the matter of definition of "blueprint." He said the JCS have made their comments on the question of whether our past positions on numbers is to be abandoned or held in an inactive status (which Mr. Stassen had raised earlier and which comes under paragraph 2 of Secretary Dulles' letter), but with respect to the blueprint paper, they have not indicated the problem of what the actual total numbers might be.

Mr. Amory asked whether it was true that the technical use of "order of battle" included only authorized strength and would not show how much understrength existed. General Loper agreed and said he would construe this to include our National Guard and Reserve forces, but it would also include pertinent information as to their equipment and strength; e.g., to say you have fifteen National Guard divisions is incomplete unless you give some indication of their capability and effectiveness.

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Mr. Stassen noted that, psychologically, the term "order of battle" does not have a good connotation for the uninformed and suggested it might be desirable to look for a better phrase.

ACTION: To check words and phrases in US  
military dictionaries as well as  
Soviet, French and British terminology which might be substituted  
for "order of battle." (Col. Firehock)

Mr. Stassen said we could either say that we consider the "blueprint" to be a negotiable matter as long as it is reciprocal, or under proper circumstances we could present a paper outlining the detail we believe should be included in "blueprint". He said he was inclined to think the second approach is preferable since it was furthering the President's initiative to use the term. The paper would have two features: (a) the meaning would be the same to each of the five countries involved, and (b) to the extent it becomes public, it would have a rather favorable public understanding and connotation. Mr. Amory suggested as a working basis the standard TO table in the army, and the major items of equipment might be used.

Replying to Mr. Denkin's question as to whether a list of military plants, facilities, and installations, with their locations, would include American atomic energy facilities, General Loper said that would depend somewhat on the total purpose of laying this "blueprint" before the Disarmament Subcommittee--whether it is to carry out a concept which would lead to a complete understanding among all nations as to their complete military posture, or whether the initial purpose is to set up a system which is primarily intended to guard against surprise attack and an easing of tensions caused by that fear. If the purpose is the former, it must necessarily include the atomic energy facilities; if it is the latter, it could be more limited and would not necessarily include the backup facilities from a manufacturing standpoint. Mr. Stassen noted that the President had emphasized the surprise attack factor, but related it to the total armament problem.

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Mr. Wainhouse asked whether it might not be wiser to approach the problem from a more comprehensive standpoint than simply the concept of surprise attack, since the USSR is presumed to know where our atomic installations are, and we are not as well informed on theirs.

Mr. Stassen pointed out that anything you disclose you are presumably willing to have verified and that leads into the definition of how detailed a verification can be--AEC would be very concerned as to how detailed the verification of our atomic installations is. Also, he said, there is a legal question involved--if you have a reciprocal agreement it presumably raises the question of a treaty and its ratification. Mr. Ford said the Department of Justice is working on that point as well as other related questions and will soon be ready to go into the legal basis for such action.

Replying to Mr. Amory's question, Mr. Stassen said it was the President's view that an opposite national plane would be used in the reconnaissance flights, but that there would be a national of the home country aboard; that is what is meant by "but monitored." The concept is that they would land at a port of entry, be inspected, and the national of the home country could board the plane and the flights would ensue.

C. US Position. Mr. Stassen asked for views on how comprehensive the US position should be. Mr. Wainhouse said this involves a delicate judgement and he would be inclined to accept the wisdom of the Joint Chiefs on those matters. He suggested it might be wiser, in view of the fact that we have less information about USSR atomic facilities than they have of ours, that we should at least include that as one of the objects to be inspected.

(1) Technical Panel. Mr. Stassen referred to the preliminary draft on the proposal to put forward a reciprocal exchange of pilot inspection by a technical panel (See Tab G) which suggest the panel consist of forty members with eight specialists from each of the five nations, and commented that he would be inclined to start out with more from each nation. If these specialists entered a country under the agreement and looked at one big airdrome or port, he said, there is a problem of whether it would mean that that same airdrome or port could be photographed from the air as a part of the trial study of the ultimate inspection design.

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General Loper said this is an important question; it may be desirable, he said, before deciding on the composition of the personnel on the panel, to decide what the object of the trial inspection might be. He agreed that aerial photography should be a part of the technical panel effort.

Mr. Stassen said some of the reasons for suggesting this technical panel were: (a) it would give a certain momentum of action and initiative in following up the focus of attention on inspection and the President's proposal; (b) it would be a partial lowering of the Iron Curtain; and (c) it would add something to our defense knowledge, and would present a better possibility of both designing, and getting the acceptance of an effective inspection system than if we were to attempt to study and agree on it without actually getting people into the country to observe the facilities. Also, he said, we were inclined to feel that if an agreement on such an exchange of technical people were accomplished, at about the time they could start moving, our other total studies related to an inspection design would have been presented, reviewed by the interested Departments, the final action of the President would have been completed, and we would then have an initial position within the US Government that would serve as a basis on which our participants on the panel would go into other countries and check.

Mr. Stassen agreed with General Loper that in selecting the first objective, it should be something significant but not too revealing; also, there should be a correct balance maintained so that we don't show something more significant than anyone else. He said he envisioned that the proposal, after agreement had been reached, would state exactly how many people could enter each country, how many days they could stay, exactly what they could see, and how they would travel.

Mr. Bowie said he believed that rather than have inspection of two of everything, such as airdromes and ports, there could be agreement on how much can be learned from say, aerial photography, and that could be done by inspecting a single installation. Mr. Stassen pointed out that the method of storing and moving bombs to the planes and airdromes, the method of traffic control, the method of radar in the flights and in the ports, and the type of submarine or battleship administration, are very practical things that the technicians would observe as they sat down together at samples of objects of control, and thus they would design a more effective system than if they never saw the object they were going to control.

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